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Intelligence sharingAbstract Organizations, including governments, have been attempting to
address cyber threats for years by deploying technologies (e.g., security perimeter
defences). These technologies are overarching policies and regulations designed to
encourage resilient cybersecurity strategies that safeguard not only data, but also
properties and human lives. Implementing these technologies is one thing, but
ensuring their effectiveness is another. Lack of effectiveness and inability to satisfy
existing government requirements and approaches in dealing with cyber threats
and attacks are likely to continue until better approaches are employed. These
approaches may emanate from effective regulations, intelligence gathering and
sharing, and good security practices to workable alliances and interactions with
other communities. This work is proposing approaches based on the premise that
cybersecurity strategies must adhere to and be guided by the effectiveness criteria:
that is, intervention and retaliatory approaches should be employed andutilized on
the basis of their empirically demonstrated effectiveness to combat cyber threats.
ª 2014 The Author. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of King Saud
University. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).3.0/).
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In achieving effective cybersecurity (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/events/
6230/intelligence_in_the_private_sector.html, 2014), as in employing effective
cyber warfare preparation and governance, the importance of quickly recognizing
cyber threats concerns the most basic elements of their identiﬁcation, recognition,
and employment of appropriate courses of action.
It is a challenge for policy makers and practitioners to effectively determine
potential threats as early as possible. Hence, when cyber strategies (http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/events/6230/intelligence_in_the_private_sector.html,
2014; Bernardo and Chua, 2013) are examined, there is an ideal opportunity to
observe the means through which organizations, governments in particular,
become challenged in adjusting to the expectations of their stakeholders under
the conditions of alliances, cooperativeness, socio-demographic values, and other
practical inﬂuences.
In these conditions, the opportunity must be explored to develop processes and
approaches that are survivable long-term. These conditions, however, do not
reﬂect effective governance and, most of all, effective strategies in dealing with
cyber threats, because these conditions are: ﬁrstly, inﬂuenced by practitioners’ lack
of effective interventive approach that falls short of compliance with the regula-
tions and exercise of better security mechanisms; and secondly, found to be lack-
ing comprehensive and effective retaliatory approach to launch mitigation
strategies (e.g., counterattacks, etc.).
Attaining viable strategies to address cyber threats and attacks remains a chal-
lenge (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/events/6230/intelligence_in_the_priva
te_sector.html, 2014; Bernardo and Chua, 2013) due to lack of concentration on
tailoring approaches to address appropriate actions to cyber threats: (a) key but
uninformed practitioners are too conservative in meeting their agenda to carry
out their own strategies on dealing with cyber threats; (b) another is the slowness
of legitimate governments to move beyond mere identiﬁcation of cyber threats by
introducing enforceable regulation and actions, and viable solutions to curb and
address them, and to fully recognize the importance of alliances with industries
and other governments to have uniﬁed and effective approaches to combat cyber
threats.
Central to the process of this phenomenon is the general perception that trivi-
alizes cyber threats and cyber security practices and the kind of impact that led to
the lack of effective approaches. Consequently, practitioners become more reluc-
tant to stably carry out their responsibilities and raise their level of awareness in
order to minimize threats.
Theory and research into cyber security should therefore shift across various
perspectives, and not be limited to: (1) retaliatory and interventive approaches,
(2) compliance to existing regulations, (3) multi-way process and contemporary
view of cybersecurity as fundamentally an emergent necessity of interaction and
146 D.V. Bernardoalliances in which governments and industries jointly develop stronger cyber-polic-
ing and intelligence-sharing capabilities, and (4) appropriate statistical methods to
achieve effective threat detection and sustainable solutions.
Interventive approach is introduced, addressing, in particular, the underlying
practitioners’ low level of awareness and their limited intelligence sharing, in terms
of capabilities and access, and knowledge in dealing with cyber threats on a large
scale, and implementing speciﬁc courses of action in given circumstances (during
the onset of conﬁrmed cyber attacks).
Methods for developing retaliatory approach, on the other hand, is reviewed
and investigated. These include ways to detect and subsequently derail the source
of the cyber attacks, and to execute defence mechanisms that can lead to infra-
structure shutdown to halt further attacks and minimize damage to properties.
These mechanisms can include terminating communication services across regio-
nal domains (e.g., DNS-domain name services) that provide the means to channel
collaborative cyber attacks.
This work captures the importance of effective cybersecurity strategies from the
standpoint of statistical representations (Berger and Wolpert, 1988) to symbolic
interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Bernardo and Smith, 1994), which represents a
shifting relationship between practitioners and governments attempting to ﬁt their
lines of agenda together to develop effective and interactive cybersecurity
strategies.
This paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 provide an overview of criteria and
methods, Sections 3 and 4 highlight discussions, and Section 4 concludes this work.
2. Guide to developing cybersecurity approaches
Competing requirements (e.g., regulations, technology, intelligence, goals, etc.)
produced effectively advance, control-capable approaches, which can be used to
guide practitioners.
These approaches form strategies on cybersecurity that can assist and enable
practitioners to select and employ consistent determination relevant to their infra-
structure, and which have been found to be effective for the desired outcome
(Bernardo et al., 2009; Bernardo and Chua, 2013). These approaches should con-
tain components that refer to the requirements that can be systematically varied
within the intervention process, and which are capable of reliable deployment
across organizations. To meet these requirements, concepts and variables must
be clearly identiﬁed, deﬁned, and linked to empirical referents.
Statements of interventive and actions of retaliatory approaches must contain
explicit predictions of the relationship between the inputs (processes), tactical
courses of action and the desired outcomes (e.g., minimization of threats and val-
idations of enforced mechanisms, and introduction of strike back mechanisms).
Interventive statements and actions of retaliation of this nature serve three
indispensable functions: (1) they facilitate and deliberate selection of intelligence
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on the basis of its applicability to a particular situation and infrastructure; (2) they
provide the framework within which their empirical validity can be tested – that is,
they enable practitioners to design cybersecurity architectures and infrastructures
in which the effectiveness of both interventive and retaliatory assumptions can be
rigorously investigated and validated; and (3) they facilitate tactical countermea-
sures and counterattacks, whenever possible, to halt any efforts of derailment
and curtailment of services solely dependent on cyber-technology.
These criteria must be met if the creation of both approaches is to contribute
meaningfully to knowledge capable of guiding practice in cybersecurity. Of these
criteria, two basic ones will be used for classifying both approaches: (1) whether
the interventions and retaliation – the independent variables or components –
are empirically denotable and can be reliably enacted by practitioners and, there-
fore, replicated in the subsequent review and in practice and (2) the extent to which
the outcomes against which the effectiveness of interventions and counter-attacks
is assessed are measured with sufﬁcient validation to allow reliable replication to
other organizations across the geographical locations.
2.1. Expected outcome
The utility of differentiating the outcomes of the deﬁned interventive and retalia-
tory approaches depends on the speciﬁc goal set in a particular effort to address
cyber threats. The attainment of maximum outcomes (MO) denotes the extent
to which the effort is successful and determines the organization’s readiness to
combat cyber threats, whereas intermediate outcomes (IO) are those deemed to
be necessary preconditions of the maximum outcomes.
This work relies on the efﬁcacy of interventions and retaliations that legiti-
mately targets either intermediate or maximum outcomes. However, the evalua-
tion effort concerns the extent to which problems are addressed successfully
through interventive and retaliatory approaches; therefore maximum outcomes
must be included as dependent variables.
The central focus in this work is concerned where existing efforts appropriately
address the different needs for effective practice, and the analysis in this work is
guided by the goal set in the preceding sections. Existing works and practices par-
ticularly in major industries (e.g., telecommunications, transportation and electric-
ity), though limited, have been analyzed to assess the relative emphasis on cyber
security research, which can contribute to the community of practice on the effec-
tiveness of both approaches and the relationship between replicability of these
approaches. With some countries or organizations lacking cybersecurity prepared-
ness and guidelines, this work focuses on available roadmaps and collected data
sets available, instead of government-restricted classiﬁed information.
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It is important to select industries (e.g., academe, governments, and private ﬁnan-
cial sectors) and provide an assessment period to reasonably represent the primary
current thrusts of cybersecurity research. The practices are focused on organiza-
tions across the US, UK, Asia Paciﬁc (especially on those recently targeted by
cyber attacks, such as Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, the US, and Australia).
This work builds on initially collected data from 3 identiﬁed organizations
(Bernardo, 2012, 2013; Bernardo and Chua, 2013) with regional presence in the
UK, US and Asia, and focuses on one recently completed survey on risks and
threats on cloud computing. The choice of the work speciﬁcally on cloud comput-
ing in this sample can be considered more opportunistic rather than monolithic.
Given the recent popularity of cloud computing across governments and industries
and due its identiﬁed risks, the choice has been alluded to the beneﬁts of under-
standing the current trends and of further underscoring the importance of cyber
threats across many infrastructures.
To observe a situation where cyber threats are suspected to be taking place, it is
important to deﬁne that central to the interaction where these occur is the signif-
icant process of identifying and differentiating cyber attacks from the other
attacks (i.e., localized) that occur on a certain period; considering the impact of
these attacks into account; and responding by acting according to the existing
courses of action.
The outcome of this observation inﬂuences the development of cybersecurity
approaches. However, this observation should be supported by statistical repre-
sentations to provide empirical evidence. These further solicit and substantiate
the development of approaches that require resources.
2.3. Statistical representations
There has been a continuing thrust to identify and quantify attacks, which consid-
ered incidents to determine appropriate mitigation strategies to obfuscate them.
Organizations developed and improved their courses of action, including identiﬁ-
cation and frequencies of incidents to determine if they are localized or if these are
considered large-scale cyber attacks. These plans include statistical representa-
tions, which are tailored to the organizations and practitioners of attacks, as dis-
cussed in 3.1.1 (Bernardo, 2012, 2013; Bernardo et al., 2009; Bernardo and Chua,
2013).
2.3.1. Ranking methoddi ¼
Xm
j¼1
jrij cjjði ¼ 1; . . . ; nÞ: ð1Þ
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ith organization on the jth risk (i= 1,. . .n and j= 1,. . .m) (Bernardo, 2013;
Bernardo et al., 2009).
If cj is the group rank for the jth risk, then the ith organization’s absolute dis-
tance from the group ranking.
Data collected in the following works (Bernardo, 2012, 2013; Bernardo and
Chua, 2013) were also relevant to supply components for representation in Eq.
(1). Results from Bernardo (2012, 2013) are found on Table 1.
Additionally, we look at the works (Bernardo, 2012, 2013; Bernardo and Chua,
2013; Bernardo and Hoang, 2012; Bernardo and Smith, 1994) surveyed across
organizations in different industries using basic frequency analysis and correlation
method (FC).
2.3.2. Frequency and correlation method (FC)
 f(i) frequency of incidents i in given space.
 u (a) correlation of frequency of incidents identiﬁed assuming speciﬁc number
of attacks is a (is a numerical representation of attacks).Tabl
CR1
CR2
CR3
CR4
CR5
CR6
CR7
CR8
CR9
CR1
CR1uðaÞ ¼ R0 6 i 6 nfðiÞpði aÞ ð2Þ
P(x) is frequency of incidents identiﬁed across a given period t as example we
selected one organization adopting cloud computing.
The data (Table 1) are gathered through a case survey conducted (http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/events/6230/intelligence_in_the_private_sector.html,
2014). Full results of this particular work are found on Appendix.
The ranking of each threat is gathered from the result of the survey conducted
with organizations with 35,000 clients based in Melbourne, Australia, Hong Kong,
and Malaysia (Bernardo, 2012, 2013; Bernardo et al., 2009; Bernardo and Chua,
2013).
From Eq. (1), the ranking is organized from survey returned.
Thereof,
Sequence = CR1CR2CR4CR6e 1 Common threats of cloud computing.
1 Uncoordinated change controls and misconﬁgurations .095
2 Inadequate Access Control Management .090
3 Single point of failure/coding .082
4 Single tier security .080
5 Poor IP pool management .073
6 Loose data distribution .070
7 Cross tenancy workloads .065
8 Unmonitored/unassigned resources .058
9 Lack of conﬁguration information and uniformity .052
0 10 Inherent risks of cloud computing .045
1 11 Environmental/calamities .033
150 D.V. BernardoNumber of attacks = 3
Frequency of each threat is found on Table 1 and summarized in Fig. 1.
Note that CR1 ranks the highest as shown in the ﬁgure, with CR 11 ranking the
lowest.
From Eq. (2) so here,uðaÞ ¼ 0:095pð1 aÞ þ 0:090pð2 aÞ þ 0:082pð3 aÞ þ 0:080pð4 aÞ
þ 0:073pð5 aÞ þ 0:070pð6 aÞ þ 0:065pð7 aÞ þ 0:058pð8 aÞ
þ 0:052pð9 aÞ þ 0:045pð10 aÞ þ 0:033pð11 aÞMost plausible sequence based on u
– a= 2, u (a)=.0410
– a= 3, u (a)=.0575 CR1CR2CR4CR6
– a= 4, u (a)=.0252
– a= 5, u (a)=.0190
The threat value is 3 which is CR4 (Single Tier Security).
We arrived to CR4 since we set an initial value of 0 when determining u.
The result highlights that threat is localized albeit the accuracy of this descrip-
tion is depending on the frequencies and threat’s criticality. Criticality is deﬁned by
Bernardo (2012) and Bernardo and Chua (2013).0
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Eq. (3) represents the cost involved when a threat arises and the costs to mitigate
it. This therefore does not necessarily means that the higher the frequency of a
threat occurring, the least likely it is localized.
Threats are considered large scale when they have high frequencies and with
high costs, that is – the criticality and impact are considered high by practitioners.
2.3.3. Practical application: Stochastic matrix and Markov process (Brooks, 1998)
The next method is validating threats. Given that the ﬁrst state validation of a sus-
pected threat, (Bernardo and Chua 2013; Bernardo, 2012).
I (TCP/IP Threats validation) 30%
II (Application threats validation) 20%
III (Others/Users/Environmental threats validation) 50%We need to determine the rate of the second, third, and fourth validations,
assuming that the transition probabilities for the given intervals are presented
by the matrixA ¼
To I To II To III
0:8 0:1 0:1 From I
0:1 0:7 0:2 From II
0:0 0:1 0:9 From IIIRemark. A square matrix with nonnegative entries and row sums all equal to 1 is
called stochastic matrix. A therefore is a stochastic matrix. A stochastic process
(Berger, 2006; Brooks, 1998) for which the probability of entering a certain state
depends only on the last state occupied (and on the matrix governing the process)
is called a Markov process (Bernardo and Chua, 2013; Bernardo and Smith, 1994).
Note: Markov Process is a prerequisite example in understanding how the
approach can be beneﬁcial in identifying threats and generating courses of action.
Solution. From matrix A and the ﬁrst state we can compute the second state:
I (Network related threat validation) 0:8  30þ 0:1  20þ 0:50 ¼ 26 ½%
II (Localized threat validation) 0:1  30þ 0:7  20þ 0:1  50 ¼ 22 ½%
III (Other threat validation) 0:1  30þ 0:2  20þ 0:9  50 ¼ 52 ½%:
The sum is 100%, as it should be. We present this in matrix form. Let the col-
umn vector x denote the ﬁrst stat. Thus,
152 D.V. BernardoxT = [30 20 50]. Let y denote the second state.
ThenyT ¼ xTA ¼ ½30 20 50
0:8 0:1 0:1
0:1 0:7 0:2
0 0:1 0:9
¼ ½26 22 52Similarly, for the third and fourth we get the state vectors, as you may verify,zT ¼ yTA ¼ ðxTAÞA ¼ xTA2 ¼ ½23:0 23:2 53:8
uT ¼ zTA ¼ ðxTA2ÞA ¼ xTA3 ¼ ½20:72 23:92 55:36:In the second state, the network related threat validation will be 26%, the localized
threat validation is 22% and the other threat validation 52%. For the third state
the corresponding ﬁgures are 23%, 23.2%, and 53.8%. For the fourth state, they
are 20.72%, 23.92% and 55.36%.
The above example can assist in achieving reasonable estimations for how val-
idations should be performed in future threat identiﬁcation using basic Markov
process. The inputs (Brooks, 1998; Chen et al., 2007; Congdon, 2003; Goldstein,
2006; O’Hagan and Forster, 2004) and assumptions to be accurate, they must
be based on data collected on ﬁeld.
2.4. Summary
The methods highlight essential approaches in determining ways to effectively
identify and address cyber attacks. This means that from the point of view of the-
ory, practice, and method, cyber attacks may be observed and validated through
direct observation; one may also experience it, comparing by gauging the existing
criteria, using the techniques and methods presented, and benchmarking them
against the others as the attacks continue to unfold over time.
The initial observation of the recent cases is the discovery of lack of effective
strategies, technologies, and resources to carry out effective cybersecurity. This
observation is made as a result of static, one-way observation on incidents that
reportedly occurred. One-way observation means observing circumstances with
limited interaction (e.g., lack of active data gathering, of active participation of
those involved, and of consistent monitoring and review, to name a few). Dealing
with reports of cyber attacks must therefore involve a dynamic multi-way complex
process of interactions and intelligence sharing between those who are tasked to
take courses of action and those who are directly affected by them and those
who deﬁned governance and compliance (e.g., emergency response group, govern-
ment funded groups, and industry).
It is not uncommon to view such interactions as interpretation of reality of
effective collaboration through strong alliances. These interactions and interpreta-
tions, however, can break down at any stage throughout the process. Therefore, it
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Table 4) are developed through acceptable methods.
Statistical representations certainly provide ways to deﬁne and determine
important inputs for the use of methods and processes in determining threat pro-
ﬁles for practitioners. These are important to collectively introduce sustainable
approaches to deal with cyber threats.
Low awareness of cyber threats and lack of satisﬁable and uniﬁed approaches
to address them stem from lack of collaboration, compliance to regulations,
and, most importantly, methods to developing common strategies.
3. Discussion and framework
Trends in the development of conceptual framework to detect cyber threats have
paralleled those in speciﬁc regions (Bernardo et al., 2009; Bernardo and Smith,
1994) where threats have occurred and/or are continuing. In recent years, the
problem of cyber threats has become an identiﬁable issue for many organizations
that can be addressed by the appropriate intervention.
The problem of cyber threats can be drawn from a cultural or anthropological
reason, or just merely lack of political will to invest resources to develop effective
intervention strategies.
This work proposes conﬂict-enculturation (awareness and adaptation of envi-
ronment susceptible to attacks) as a model of tackling cyber threats through alli-
ances, intelligence sharing, participation and interaction. The major thrust of this
approach has been the deep concern for the analysis of meaning, in which govern-
ments consider the use of cyber warfare and community involvement to advance
cybersecurity and adapt to the demands of peoples’ dependency on the Internet.
It is therefore important to raise fundamental questions, such as: (1) Have social
and cultural behaviors of both governments and industries toward cyber threats
played an important role in deﬁning interventive and retaliatory approaches to
address cyber threats? (2) What approaches speciﬁc to governments are required
to tackle these threats? (3) How do governments and industries achieve outcomes
that meet their respective cybersecurity agenda?
These questions are best conducted in longitudinal studies across industries. A
periodic analysis of trends may assist in creating methods that raise awareness and
address concerns on how cyber threats can be quickly identiﬁed, validated, and
resolved. Nonetheless, securing cyber-infrastructure remains a challenge to many,
especially in an era of cyber threats.
To introduce a brief review of the substance underlying the perspectives on
cyber threats, Table 3 highlights a partial framework of the ingredients for deter-
mining cyber threats. There are similarities between each approach, illustrating
their efﬁcacy.
As presented earlier in Section 2, the approaches on Table 2 highlight the attain-
ment of maximum outcomes (MO), which denotes the extent to which the effort is
Table 2 Values of u.
A u (a) A u (a) A (a) A u (a)
0 .0482 3 .0575 6 .0660 9 .0267
1 .0364 4 .0252 7 .0442 10 .0635
2 .0410 5 .0190 8 .0202 11 .0262
Table 3 High level framework.
Cyber threats – more of social and
political and less of a technical failure
Interaction/participation and cyber threats
analysis multi-way process
Cyber threats motivate initial perspectives
which are culturally adaptive
Relationship between governments extended
to group dynamics
Induced propensities, attitude and values toward
regulations and diﬀering demographical and
cultural perspectives
Community functions as joint agents
inﬂuencing individual response in the context
of cyber threats
Interact with various contexts with disregard
for exercising sensitivity and respect
Strategies constructed through interaction
among participants to channel and exchange
viewpoints to raise awareness of existing cyber
threats
Table 4 General approaches.
Approaches Outcomes Maximum/
intermediate
Alliances, collaboration Practice based participation IO
Interventive approach Practice based approach, tailored solution,
security architecture
MO
Cyber security community of practice Speciﬁc requirements of cyber big data a
security
MO
Integration of government regulations on
cyber security strategies into industries
(particularly those in public utilities, e.g.,
transportation, electricity, water and
communications to name a few)
Establishment of community of practice
related to focusing on cyber threats.
MO/IO
Collaborated eﬀorts addressing issues with
practical solutions and long term outcomes
154 D.V. Bernardosuccessful and determines the organization’s readiness to combat cyber threats,
whereas intermediate outcomes (IO) are those deemed to be necessary precondi-
tions of the maximum outcomes.
Surveys and studies focusing on the efﬁcacy of interventive and retaliatory
approaches may legitimately target either intermediate or maximum outcomes.
To consider the proposed approaches, it is best to frame a practical architec-
ture, as part of the overall goal of achieving maximum outcomes (MO).
As a guide, Tables 5 and 6 highlight the critical components deﬁned in this work
for the creation of a security strategy. The components include, but are not limited
to, the selected methods discussed in Section 2.
Speciﬁc components for retaliatory approach (Table 6) focus on countermea-
sures and counterattacks where cyber attacks have been mounting – highlighting
Table 6 Speciﬁc components under retaliatory approach.
Stages and components Determination for the oﬀensive actions
DEFENCES Strike back capabilities, system tracking and
review
ISOLATION Blocking sources, shutting systems and core
infrastructures
SURVEILLANCE Review attacks and determine courses of
actions ie., intervention from agencies, advice
from regulators
Table 5 Speciﬁc components under interventive approach.
Stages and components Determination for security architecture
Validation method (Bernardo, 2012) Accurately detect anomalies post
implementation of systems that support
infrastructures
Type post implementation
SDL (Bernardo, 2013) Microsoft’s’ Security Development Lifecycle
(SDL) has set a standard for software and
product development. This describes a
security requirement deﬁnition at the initial
phase of the projects, one that involves an
analysis of threat modeling at the systems
design phase, a static program analysis at the
implementation phase, and the penetration
test at the test phase (Bernardo, 2013)
Type all cycle
Ranking method (Bernardo, 2013; Bernardo
et al., 2009; Bernardo and Chua, 2013)/
correlation
Prioritizing risks to ensure appropriate
mitigations put in place
Type PRE and POST
Other tailored components (Security
technology, governance and processes)
Technical architecture focusing on integrating
viable security mechanisms and technologies.
Governance and Standards
Cyber threats as a clear and present danger 155the need for governments and organizations to form better approaches to control
and minimize damage.
The trends of alliances encourage participation and interaction that provide
greater access to many experts and tools. Awareness of the issue, of course, can
be achieved and raised through tailored approaches. Some organizations, how-
ever, have limited opportunities to forge alliances that encourage participation,
but engaging with other communities is an important step to developing interac-
tion that can result in feasible approaches.
4. Conclusion
The introduction of satisﬁable approaches ensures that there exists an ongoing
process encompassing all of the broadly identiﬁable stages within the deﬁned
cybersecurity strategy.
156 D.V. BernardoThe important element in contemporary cybersecurity, however, is the fact that
cyber threats are not solely a technical phenomenon, but also a social one, result-
ing from an act of behavior that stems from cultural or political action that occurs
throughout a cyber attack.
Integrating viable interventive and retaliatory approaches within the cybersecu-
rity strategy through alliances, technology, processes, rules of engagement, intelli-
gence gathering and sharing, statistical methods, participation and interaction
with communities of practice (where their use may signiﬁcantly achieve concomi-
tant economic and political risks that will not derail national security and inﬂict
damage to one’s assets) remains an important case for organizations to consider,
especially today when cyber threats are prevalent.
The increasingly complex threats to organizations, furthermore, highlight the
need to explore the use of intelligence by industries to develop the proposed
approaches. According to the recent work (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
events/6230/intelligence_in_the_private_sector.html, 2014), governments are
unable to share classiﬁed information about threats. As a result, practitioners
are creating their own intelligence capabilities within their organizations. The
work (http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/events/6230/intelligence_in_the_priv
ate_sector.html, 2014), which involved corporate leaders, strongly raises questions
about the need of industry intelligence gathering and sharing, such as, ‘‘How do
companies organize to obtain it, and how can the government support them?’’
‘‘Is this a growing trend?’’ ‘‘How do companies collaborate in intelligence?’’
‘‘How do the governments view private intelligence efforts?’’ ‘‘How do private
and government intelligence entities relate to one another?’’ and ‘‘What does this
all mean for the future of intelligence work?’’
Future work will be focused on exploring these compelling questions.Appendix ACode Rank Risks/threats (2011/year) Likelihood Impact Frequencies Counter measures Action
CR1 1 Uncoordinated
change controls and
misconﬁgurations
Moderate M .095 Applicable governance,
control and auditing
Avoid
CR2 2 Inadequate Access
Control Management
Moderate M .090 Role-based access
control
Reduce
CR3 3 Single point of
failure/coding
Moderate M .082 Service downtime Reduce
CR4 4 Single tier security Likely H .080 Predicate and
homomorphic encryptions
Avoid
CR5 5 Poor IP pool
management
Moderate M .073 Lock step approach in
IP assignment and
re-assignment
Reduce
(continued on next page)
Appendix A (continued)
CR6 6 Loose data
distribution
Moderate M .070 Speciﬁc data ownership
and storage management
Reduce
CR7 7 Cross tenancy
workloads
Moderate M .065 Platform attestation,
ensuring CSP meets
SLA/OLA
Reduce
CR8 8 Unmonitored/
unassigned resources
Likely H .058 Applicable governance,
control and
auditing
Avoid
CR9 9 Lack of conﬁguration
information and
uniformity
Unlikely L .052 Eﬀective dependency
map for each
resource/tenant
Reduce
CR10 10 Inherent risks
of cloud computing
Moderate M .045 Virtual private cloud
at the premium rate,
segregating
logical and physical
infrastructures
Avoid
CR11 11 Environmental/
calamities
Unlikely L .033 Applicable mitigation
strategies, and governance ,
disaster and
business continuity
programs
Reduce
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